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Conflicting Parts of Happiness 
in Aristotle’s Ethics*
Nicholas White
One of the most important developments in recent ethics, not only in 
the English-speaking world but on the European continent as well, 
has been the resurgence of interest in the ethics of Aristotle, not only 
as a relic of ancient history but also as food for modern philosophical 
thought. I want to try here to shed some light on the philosophical, 
historical, and historigraphical questions that are raised by this de­
velopment.
I want to articulate and justify some reservations about the widely 
accepted ascription of certain aims to Aristotle’s ethics. To explain 
these matters fully, I shall have to give a broad view of both historio­
graphical background and interpretative problems, skirting a number
* of detailed exegetical problems. Nevertheless I hope that my synoptic 
account will, without resolving questions definitively, help make reso­
lution possible in due course.
* * *
When the modern historiography of ancient Greek ethics began 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century, there emerged two main 
interpretations of Greek views about the relation of a person’s good 
to such considerations as the good of others and conformity to ethical 
standards. I shall call these latter—just for brevity, and not to exploit 
the connotations of the labels— “ethical and altruistic considerations” 
or, simply, “the broader considerations.” Issues of “ethics” and “altru­
ism” are closely linked, and on some views are even identical, but the 
relationship between them can be ignored here. I use the term “ethics”
♦ I treat most of these matters more fully in a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled 
“Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics,” and some of them also in an article, “Neoaris- 
totelian Inclusivist Eudaimonism: Some of Its Problems,” Internationale Zeitschrift fur  
Philosophie (1994), pp. 129-44. For very helpful critical comments on an earlier draft 
of this article I am much indebted to Julia Annas, Terence Irwin, and especially Wil­
liam Frankena.
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rather than “morals” because the latter has irrelevant connotations, 
especially in recent philosophical discussion, and is anyway too 
restrictive.1
It is convenient to think of the two interpretations that I have 
mentioned as the Kantian and the Hegelian Interpretations. They were 
not originated by Kant or Hegel, but they involve ideas that are stan­
dardly—whether rightly or wrongly—associated with them. The mne­
monic value of the labels is worth the inaccuracies that they may 
embody. Each of these two interpretations is based on a view—for 
short, the Kantian and the Hegelian Views, which are nearly enough 
for our purposes the views held by their respective namesakes—about 
the relationship between a person’s good and those two sorts of 
broader consideration.
* * *
The Kantian View is dualistic. It regards one’s own good (or happi­
ness or well-being) and the broader considerations as two independent 
types of consideration that a person may take into account in delibera­
tion. For present purposes we may abstract from many details of the 
distinction. For instance, it is insignificant here whether one’s own 
happiness is a strictly rational consideration or simply a matter of 
“inclination.” For now the important points are simply these: first, 
that each o f the two types of consideration is thought of as having its 
own independent force, not derivative from that of the other, and, 
second, that they might conceivably conflict, in the sense of sometime s 
recommending different courses of action or ways of being. If they 
do conflict, a person would have to follow only one and not the other. 
And even if they do not conflict, a philosopher might feel called upon 
to decide which is the more basic.
The Kantian Interpretation presupposes the existence of the two 
types of consideration admitted by the Kantian View. On this basis 
the Kantian Interpretation holds that Greek ethics is eudaimonistic, in 
the sense of taking a person’s sole rational end to be his own happiness. 
From the Kantian standpoint, however, this is to say that the Greeks 
recognized only one side of the dualism, the side involving one’s own 
happiness, and did not realize that the broader considerations have 
their own quite independent force. A strict adherent of the Kantian 
View would believe, too, that ethical considerations are always overrid­
ing, while an even more extreme Kantian (more extreme, perhaps, 
than Kant) would deny that one’s own happiness is a rational consider­
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that that term is used to discuss. Prudence involves aiming for one’s good. Different 
conceptions o f one’s good generate correspondingly different conceptions of prudence.
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ation at all. But apart from these variations, the main element of 
the Kantian Interpretation is that Greek ethics fails, at the start, to 
acknowledge anything except one’s own happiness as an independent 
consideration governing action or deliberation.
Greek ethics only compounds this mistake, the Kantian Interpre­
tation says, when it tries to justify ethical considerations by appeal to 
one’s own good. This, the charge runs, is the wrong kind of justification 
for ethics, which has its own independent type of justification anyway. 
On the Kantian View it is a mistake not to recognize that ethical 
considerations can genuinely weigh against one’s happiness and should 
be sought for their own sake.2
* * *
The Hegelian View, on the other hand, disagrees with the Kantian 
View about the existence of a genuine dualism. Denying that one’s 
own happiness and the broader considerations really constitute two 
independent types of consideration, the Hegelian View holds that 
where the Kantian View sees a difference between them, and thus a 
possibility of conflict, there really is neither.
The contrast between the Hegelian View and the Kantian View 
can be best seen by focusing on how an individual’s happiness or good 
is understood. As I have just said, the Kantian View conceives of 
happiness in such a way that there can turn out to be a conflict between 
one’s own happiness and the broader considerations. On the Hegelian 
View, however, happiness is from the start conceived as so constituted 
that the broader considerations are in harmony with it.
The Hegelian View has been developed in two main ways. One 
way is to hold that one’s well-being is in some sense identical with the 
well-being o f others and/or one’s own conformity to ethical standards. 
Call that view fusionism. The other way is to maintain that one’s own 
well-being in some sense “includes” these two things. Call that inclusiv- 
ism? A central aim of the Hegelian View is to explain how such an 
identity or inclusion can hold.
The Hegelian Interpretation of Greek ethics says simply that Greek 
ethics accepted the Hegelian View, with its denial of the Kantian con­
trast between the two types of consideration. (Notice that the Kantian 
Interpretation does not say that the Greeks adopted the Kantian View; 
on the contrary.) Under the Hegelian Interpretation, as under the 
Kantian Interpretation, the Greeks are said to be eudaimonists. How­
ever, according to the Hegelian Interpretation, Greek eudaimonism
2. Kant himself, o f course, often denied that happiness is a well-defined notion at 
all {Groundwork, sec. 399) and also usually denied that it is a consideration entertained 
by reason.
3. The term is used by Richard Kraut in Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), in a slightly different sense from mine.
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did not and could not generate any conflict with ethical and altruistic 
considerations, nor—one should also note—could it be egoistic or 
selfish by virtue of ignoring them.
Under the Hegelian Interpretation, moreover, the Greek philo­
sophical project of trying to show that happiness and ethical action 
go together is not, as it is under the Kantian Interpretation, a business 
of providing ulterior egoistic reasons for abiding by ethical standards. 
Instead it is a matter of demonstradng the intimate consdtutive rela­
tion—whether identity or inclusion—between happiness and confor­
mity to the broader standards.
In general, advocates of the Hegelian View claim for it the signal 
advantage o f not regarding ethical considerations as somehow external 
or alien to the individual’s concern about his own well-being. The 
Kandan View, they think, makes morality out to be an external force 
that hems the individual in. While wishing to ascribe all due impor­
tance to ethical considerations, inclusivist and fusionist accounts of 
happiness both aim to reconcile that ascription with grandng to the 
individual a relatively unrestricted commitment to his own good. The 
Hegelian Interpretation, for its part, ascribes to Greek ethics this same 
aim and also considerable success in showing how to reach it.
* * *
It would be wrong, of course, to represent either the Kantian 
Interpretation or inclusivism as a purely German phenomenon. It 
would be especially mistaken to think that the presence of inclusivism 
in recent interpretations of Aristotle is purely the result of Hegelian 
influence. Inclusivism has a long and influential history in British 
philosophy as well. As a part of his famous argument that we do 
not desire everything that we desire simply for the sake of our own 
happiness, Joseph Buder holds that “happiness consists in the gratifi­
cation of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects which are 
by nature adapted to them,” and that “love of our neighbor is one of 
those affections” in whose gratification happiness consists.4 Mill, too, 
holds something very similar. He says “the ingredients of happiness are 
very various,” a plurality of things being “desired as part of happiness.’’ 
He then says that virtue, which includes benevolence, is one of those 
ingredients. These ideas of Butler and Mill have made themselves familiar 
and have had their effect on readings of Greek philosophers.5
*  sfe *
During the first half of this century the Kantian Interpretation 
of Greek ethics was quite popular among Anglo-American philoso­
4. Joseph Butler, sermon 11, sec. 16; cf. sec. 9.
5. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 4.
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phers. In recent years, however, with the revival of philosophical sup­
port for eudaimonism, and with a concomitant reaction against Kan­
tian and allied views about the relation of morality to individual well­
being, a Hegelian Interpretation of Greek ethics, funded also by the 
inclusivist thoughts of Butler and Mill, has become much more wide­
spread than it used to be.
Latter-day eudaimonists have taken pains to deny that the eudai­
monism that many of them take themselves to share with the Greeks 
is in any objectionable sense egoistic. They think that, on the contrary, 
through an either fusionist or inclusivist development, a reasonable 
eudaimonism accords due importance to ethical and altruistic consider­
ations. Of these two options, however, inclusivism has recently been 
the more popular and important, especially among interpreters of 
Aristotle, though fusionism has some status as an interpretation of 
other Greek philosophers.6 Because I am treating Aristotle, I shall 
concentrate on inclusivism here.
Inclusivism as I am using the term comprises two theses. The first 
says that an individual’s happiness “includes,” as in some sense “parts” 
or “constituents,” a plurality of activities and states of affairs—not (stan­
dardly) the feelings occasioned in oneself by them, but the very activities 
and states of affairs in the external world themselves. The second thesis 
holds that among these component states of affairs are the good of others 
and one’s own actions in conformity with ethical standards. The senses 
of “includes,” “parts,” and the other terminology are somewhat unclear, 
but the basic idea is for now probably understandable enough.
The use of inclusivism for defending eudaimonism appears at 
first sight quite straightforward. Since happiness can be held to include 
such things as ethical and altruistic actions and states of affairs, eudai­
monism need not be objectionably egoistic. For if happiness does in­
clude those things, then seemingly in pursuing or attaining the first, 
one is eo ipso pursuing or attaining the other two as well. Happiness 
seems in this way to harmonize with the broader considerations. Thus 
it is held that although eudaimonism is “formally” egoistic, in that it 
represents one’s ultimate aim as a state of oneself, it need not be 
“substantively” egoistic, because one’s good can comprise ethical and 
altruistic components.7
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6. Fusionism finds a use in interpretations of Plato and the Stoics, e.g., to interpret 
the Stoic idea that virtue is the only good. It has also been used to explain Plato’s 
argument that justice and happiness go together: see, e.g., J. D. Mabbott, “Is Plato’s 
Republic Utilitarian?” in Plato II, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday 
Anchor, 1971), pp. 57-65.
7. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp. 32, 39, 51, 190-91; cf. Julia Annas, “The Good Life and 
the Good Lives o f Others,” Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (1992): 133—48, p. 135. The
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Inclusivism and its use in this strategy have become common 
elements in interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics. That was not always 
the case. Traditionally it has been more common to take Aristotle as 
holding that happiness is theoria, or philosophical contemplation, and 
that the best human life is the life devoted thereto. Much recent discus ­
sion, though, has taken a different line. W. F. R. Hardie suggested 
that Aristotle often uses an “inclusive” conception of the final human 
end, and J. L. Ackrill has argued that in Aristotle’s view, “the best life 
will contain all the things generally recognized as desirable, notably 
pleasure and practical activity and thought.” Many others have agreed, 
including (as I understand them) Julia Annas, John Cooper, Terence 
Irwin, and Bernard Williams.8
To a large extent, moreover, the desire to show that Aristotle’s 
ethics is not unduly egoistic has been one of the main motivations of 
the inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle. For it has been feared that 
if Aristotle believed that the goal of a human being is contemplative 
activity, then he would be advocating an intolerably selfish neglect 
of the broader considerations. This fear has intensified the welcome 
extended to inclusivist interpretations, with their prospect of harmo­
nizing the broader considerations with concern for self. Accordingly 
the defense of Aristotle against the charge of advocating egoism has 
often been carried out on an inclusivist basis.
* * *
At this point we should not fail to note the full force of the 
tradition that has made harmonizing interpretations of Aristotle seem
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issue I am discussing is whether if one is happy one will necessarily conform to ethical 
standards or, in other words, whether one can be happy without conforming to those 
standards. But one may also raise the converse issue: whether one will necessarily be' 
happy if one conforms to ethical standards or, in other words, whether conforming to 
those standards guarantees happiness. Though I say some things in this article bearing 
on the latter issue, I focus here mostly on the former.
8. The current discussion of the interpretative issue was initiated by W. F. R. 
Hardie; see “The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Philosophy 40 (1965): 277—95. The 
quotation comes from J . L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp. 135—36; see also his “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy 60 (1974): 339—59, reprinted in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 15-33. For other inclusionist. 
readings, see John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 1; Terence Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 241,254—59, and Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 16-18, pp. 439-44; Annas, “The Good Life 
and the Good Lives of Others,” pp. 136—39; and Williams. Explicit inclusionist defenses 
against the accusation of egoism are given by Williams, Annas, and Irwin. As is made 
clear by Ackrill, Annas, and Irwin, an inclusivist conception of happiness should not 
be thought o f as given simply by a list of desirable things (cf. below, p. 281 and n. 52).
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so attractive to many. This way of reading Aristotle is by no means 
new, and an awareness of its history helps us understand what is at 
stake in it.
Behind the Hegelian interpretation of Aristotle there lies an inter­
pretative tradition directed not merely at Greek philosophical ethics 
but at Greek culture as a whole, including Greek political life and 
institutions. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, in work of 
Winckelmann, Herder, Schiller, and many others, the idea arose that 
Greek art, literature, and thought and life in general exhibited a har­
mony of motivation and purpose which has been lost in our—as it 
is often put— “fragmented” modern world.9 Frequently, too, it was 
maintained—by Hegel but before him by Herder and others—that 
the Greeks achieved, at least in certain periods (Hegel invoked the so- 
called age of Pericles), a consonance of individual and public ends that 
supposedly eliminated from the Greek outlook the contrast between 
individual and social good.
This idealized picture of Greek life, it should be remarked, is 
today no longer widely accepted by students of Greek history. It held 
sway through the nineteenth century in Britain and continued to pre­
vail there and elsewhere though much of the twentieth century. Some 
dissented from this view— such as the great classicist, Wilamowitz- 
Moellendorff—but only after World War II did historians begin in 
earnest the business of debunking it.10 Now, ironically, the influence 
of the picture is probably stronger among philosophers and social 
theorists than anywhere else.
The fact that this interpretation has purported to describe not 
just philosophical thinking but Greek society and culture as a whole 
has given it important extra prestige as an account of Greek philoso­
phy. Not only did the picture of the broader culture first suggest the 
main philosophical application— namely, the idea that in the context 
of his culture a Greek might pursue his own happiness without pres­
sure from other potentially conflicting rational considerations. Beyond 
that and more important, the supposition that this idea was actually 
embodied in Greek society made it seem reasonable to claim that the 
idea had actually at some particular time and place been put into 
practice and lived. That made it more plausible to regard the idea as 
a truly workable piece of political thinking, or even as a political pro­
gram, than it would have been had it been presented merely as a
9. See Eliza M. Bishop, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1935); Henry Hatfield, Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral 
Complexity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
10. See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Reden vnd Vortrage (Berlin: Weid- 
mann, 1901), vol. 2, pp. 11 — 12.
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philosophical ideal. To rebut the charge that it was a pipe dream, one 
could point to its supposed actualization, or at least partial actualiza­
tion, in the actual world.
As a general matter I think that this picture o f Greek culture and 
philosophy, as managing to harmonize individual happiness with social 
and ethical good, is a large mistake which the two-centuries-old cliche 
of Hellenic harmony has foisted on us. Indeed, I would argue that 
Greek philosophers did not all agree about whether such a harmony 
was at all possible. “The Greeks” as a group, in fact, did not hold a 
single, Hellenically correct position on this question at all.
That, however, is more than I can argue here where my concern, 
though related to the broader one, is with the particular matter of 
Aristotle’s inclusivism.
• *  *  *
Although Aristotle does not say that he is attempting to avoid an 
egoistic position, there is nevertheless much to be said in favor of a 
harmonizing Hegelian interpretation of his view. For one thing, Aris- 
tode sometimes gives the impression that happiness is a conflict-free 
goal. He does not, to be sure, explicidy say even this. Still, no one can 
fail to notice that by contrast to Plato’s Republic in particular, Aristotle’s 
exposition dramatically downplays conflicts like the one between jus ­
tice and a person’s own good, which provided the impetus for the 
whole Republic, and does not seem to regard it as a major issue. In 
addition, he says repeatedly both that we pursue for their own sake:; 
both morally virtuous activity and the good of friends, and also that 
happiness is the end of everything that we do. These and other indica- 
dons have seemed to some interpreters to indicate that in his view, 
the pursuit o f happiness both includes and harmonizes fully with com- 
formity to ethical and altruistic standards.
In spite of all this, however, one must distinguish the claim that 
Aristotle accepts some inclusivist account of happiness from the con­
tention that he does so for the particular purpose of establishing either 
that his eudaimonism is not objectionably egoistic or that aiming ulti­
mately for one’s happiness is fully in harmony with ethical and altruis­
tic considerations. I wish to maintain that although there is weighty 
evidence for the former thing, the latter is not implied by it and is 
more than likely false.
In particular, it seems to me that existing inclusivist interpreta­
tions of Aristotle’s position have failed to take adequate account of 
conflicts, which are both serious and clearly acknowledged in the Ethics, 
between a person’s own good and conformity to broader standards. 
Aristotle’s way of dealing with these conflicts indicates, it seems to me, 
that even when he is inclined to view happiness along inclusivist lines, 
he expects inclusivism neither to bring harmony to conflicting parts
White Happiness in Aristotle’s Ethics 265
Copyright © 1995. A ll rights reserved.
of the human good nor to serve as a defense against the charge of 
egoism. In other words, although he may sometimes accept some type 
of inclusivist view, he does not do so for these particular harmonizing 
reasons which have been so prominently attributed to him.11
The conflicts in question arise in passages that are well known to 
Aristotle’s readers as problematical for non-egoistic accounts of his 
views. Much of what I shall say about them is not new, but it will serve 
to make clearer, I hope, the direction in which they ought to push 
our interpretative thinking. One passage concerns what he says about 
friendship and self-love in Ethics 9.8. The other deals with his views, 
as expressed in 10.6-8, about the best human life. In both of these 
places Aristotle seems to me to give clear indications that he recognizes 
a conflict between one’s own good and the broader considerations, and 
both passages indicate, I would say, that he is not trying to establish 
a harmony between these two things, as a harmonizing inclusivist 
interpretation would have him do.
It is well to bear in mind that the objection that Kantian Interpret­
ers bring against Greek thought as they understand it is twofold. One 
part attacks the Greeks for an alleged failure to recognize the fact (as 
they see it) that a person’s own well-being can be opposed or even 
outweighed by some other independent consideration. The second part 
says that ethical considerations are to be valued for their own sake, and 
not merely for the sake of the well-being that they might contribute to. 
Inclusivist defenders of eudaimonism have usually felt called upon to 
defend their view against objections on both of these fronts.
* * *
First of all, we have to clear away one issue about where we 
should look for the controlling evidence concerning what Aristotle’s 
position is.
Many who support a harmonizing interpretation—whether in­
clusivist or of some other kind—appeal not mainly to the Ethics but 
to the Politics, and often they hold that it supersedes the evidence of 
the Ethics. For Aristotle seems to maintain that ethics itself is in some 
sense subsumed by politics, and thus he perhaps hints that our reading 
of the treatise on the former must be governed by the treatise on the 
latter. Readers cleaving to this view, moreover, have often taken the 
Politics to support a harmonizing interpretation of all of Aristotle’s 
political and ethical views. The first book of the Politics contains his
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11. In Aristotle on the Human Good, Richard Kraut defends a noninclusivist interpre­
tation o f Aristotle’s position. Much of what he says, however, is compatible with the 
inclusivist interpretation presented here. The points o f disagreement are too complex 
to be treated adequately here.
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famous dictum that man is by nature a political animal, as well as 
numerous statements that chime both with his related claim in the 
Ethics, that an individual human being is not self-sufficient but requires 
other people with whom to realize his good, and also with his con­
tention that in the best polis or city-state, the good man and the good 
citizen are one and the same.12 All of these points seem to support 
the idea of a coincidence between a person’s good and the good of, 
even if not the whole of humankind, at least his own community.13
There are several reasons, however, not to use the Politics to sup­
port a general attribution of this idea of such a coincidence to Aristotle. 
First, the statement that in the best polis the good man is the good 
citizen is far from a general statement of the coincidence. On the 
contrary, it clearly indicates that in other political situations—which 
are by far the most common—the good man is not the good citizen, 
and that exercising virtue is not automatically consistent with conform­
ing to the demands of citizenship in less satisfactory communities.14
Second, the dependence of an individual on the polis for his devel­
opment and human existence does not imply a harmony or coincidence 
of goods between them. Severe clashes can occur between the interests 
of a person and his community even if the latter is essential for the 
former’s life, identity, or self-realization.15 When Aristotle stresses the 
connection between the individual’s life and his polis, he is not commit­
ting himself to a harmony of goods between them.
Thus, even if we take Aristotle’s statement that ethics is subsumed 
under the larger enterprise of politics to imply that claims of the Ethics 
are canceled by conflicting things that are said in the Politics—itself a 
thoroughly unwarranted inference—that would not mean that the 
latter asserts a harmony of individual and communal good that must 
be read into the former. The question of such a harmony, or the lack 
of it, must be examined within the relevant passages of the Ethics itself.
* * *
This examination requires clarity on a philosophical point. If an 
inclusivist view is to avoid the charge of egoism, it must be more
12. Aristotle Politics 1253a2-3, 1288a34-b3, Ethics 1.2, 10.9.
13. Harmonizing interpreters can be divided into those who, like Annas, regard 
it as a drawback of Aristotle’s position that his ethical concerns do not extend to alJ 
humankind, and those who, like Hegel, think that ethical concerns really are bound to 
the limits of particular historical communities and therefore agree with what they take 
to be Aristotle’s view on this matter. I shall not deal with this issue here (see, however, 
my “Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics.”)
14. Aristotle Politics 3 .4 -5 , 1277al4-24.
15. At most it might be argued that the destruction of the community cannot be 
conducive to the good of the individual, but even this need not necessarily hold. See 
Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen iiber Ethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), pp. 202—3.
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than merely inclusivist. That is, it must avail itself of a conception of 
happiness that does more than merely include the broader considera­
tions. It needs also to establish something further.
This need arises from a point that requires far more attention 
than it receives in discussions of Aristotle or elsewhere. Because of 
the ineluctable fact that the time and energy available within a human 
life are limited, goods that do not conflict of themselves can turn out 
to conflict in fact, by virtue of competing for the time and resources 
that we do have. In the normal case, spending more time and resources 
on one activity will inevitably mean spending less on another.
Moreover it will often happen that ethical and altruistic activities 
compete for our time and resources against parts of happiness that 
are in some substantive sense self-regarding or selfish. These cases 
are the ones that raise issues about egoism and selfishness.
Some such notion of substantively self-regarding goods or parts of 
happiness is acknowledged by eudaimonists who draw the distinction 
between—to use Williams’s terms—“substantive” and merely “for­
mal” egoism. For purposes of thinking here about what an objection­
able form of egoism might amount to, it seems pertinent to note that 
issues of selfishness arise out of questions about the distribution of 
things between oneself and others. Questions of distribution, in turn, 
concern goods that are scarce, in the sense that my getting more either 
entails or makes more probable others’ getdng less (either of those 
goods or of others). Accordingly, I propose to treat egoistic parts of 
happiness as those that are scarce in this rough sense.16
If it is granted that there is competition for a life’s time and 
resources between goods that are acknowledged to be substantively 
egoistic, on the one hand, and broader considerations, on the other, 
it follows that merely by saying that happiness includes the latter one 
does not ensure that a happy life must contain any particular amount 
of ethical or altruistic activity. Conceivably such activity could be 
crowded out, either to a large degree or even completely, by the pursuit 
of other parts of happiness. If that happened, there might well be 
grounds for calling such a life objectionably egoistic. To prevent this, 
an inclusivist account needs to specify that a life must, if it is to count 
as happy, contain such activities in some appropriate manner and 
degree, whatever that may be.
To put the point another way, to escape the charge an inclusivist 
account needs to specify a certain structure into which the parts of 
happiness are to fit. Merely listing the constituents will not be enough
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been raised recently in connection with questions about personal identity. I do not here 
deal with those questions; nor are inclusivists always concerned with them either.
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to spedfy what happiness is. Rather, if the account is to forestall an 
objectionable egoism, further structure must be insisted on so as to 
ensure that non-egoistic components are accorded an adequate place.
* * *
Aristotle is unquestionably aware of this sort of competition 
among the good activities which he takes happiness to involve.17 But 
in spite of many interpreters’ hopes that he has some way of harmoniz­
ing these competing goods, the evidence seems to me to indicate that 
in his opinion, conflict among them is inevitable and we have to re­
spond to it not by showing that they are really completely consistent 
with each other but by finding grounds for choosing some of them, 
at least to some extent, over others. Happiness may include various 
goods, but that does not mean that they are fully in harmony with 
each other.
In particular I do not see how to read Ethics 10.6—8 except as an 
expression of this idea. This passage has been the scene of intense 
interpretative batdes, and I cannot treat all of the pertinent issues 
adequately here. I take it, however, that in those chapters Aristotle 
asks which of two different lives is the best for a human being. One 
is the life of virtuous activity; the other is the life of theoria. It seems 
clear that he chooses the latter. For the moment, though, the important 
thing is not the choice that he makes but the very fact that he think>; 
a choice must be made.
Aristode’s presentation of the alternatives indicates that in his 
view it is impossible, within a single life, to engage satisfactorily in all 
good activities or even, in a fully adequate way, in more than one. 
For this reason, each alternative life is dominated by a single type of 
activity'.18 Moreover, Aristotle thinks that he must choose one of them.
17. See Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, pp. 129-30, and his “Aristotle 
on Friendship,” in Rorty, ed., pp. 332, 338.
18. Compare my "Good as Goal,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 27, suppl. (1989): 
169—93. There I argue that this domination does not imply that the dominant activity 
is in a strict sense to be maximized, in the sense in which utilitarianism tells us to 
maximize happiness. That is, Aristotle does not tell us that at every turn one must 
choose the act that will cause one the greatest possible amount of theoria. Rather, the 
life o f theoria is devoted to theoria in some looser sense. Thus I hold that when Aristode 
says that “Those to whom theoria belongs more fully are more truly happy,” he does 
not mean that, quite mathematically, the more theorizing one does, the happier one is 
(see 1178b24—32). Compare Daniel Devereux, “Comments," Southern Journal of Philoso­
phy 27, suppl. (1989): 195—207, p. 197. (Between Devereux and me there is considerable 
agreement, which is masked by our differing uses of the term “maximize”— his looser 
and mine stricter— which he rightly remarks on in his n. 11.) Kraut, on the other hand, 
thinks that according to Aristotle a person’s happiness is increased by each increase in 
the amount o f theoria he engages in (see his Aristotle on the Human Good, chap. 1), though 
at the same time he also appears to hold that certain obligations to engage in ethically
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If he thought that both could be combined without any loss, he would 
have written 10.6-8 very differently, with some acknowledgment that 
the need for a choice was based on a false dichotomy, and some 
indication, too, of how the best life might be constructed if it were not 
dominated by an activity of one single kind. However, he gives neither 
of these things.
* * *
I take 10.6-8, then, not as a repudiation by Aristotle of the inclusi­
vist idea that happiness contains a plurality of parts but as an 
acknowledgment that he must supplement that idea. The specification 
of happiness must consist not just in a list of its parts but also in a 
specification of the structure into which they ft. The best human life 
turns out to be dominated by theoria, as the activity to which that life is 
devoted and around which it is organized. But the best human life 
also contains other activities, which are valuable in a way that I shall 
explain below.19
Aristotle exhibits this conception in 10.8. Immediately after he 
reaches his conclusion that “happiness must be some form of theoria," 
he adds a further specification of other features of the best life: “But, 
being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is 
not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation.. . .  Still, we must 
not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or 
great things . . .  ; for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess, 
and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea.”20 This passage 
shows that the best life, even though it is dominated by theoria, will 
contain ethically virtuous activity too. It will not, however, contain 
ethically virtuous activity to the same degree as would the life devoted 
to ethical virtue, whose claim to be the best life Aristotle has at this 
point just rejected.21
In spite, then, of the widespread idea that Aristotle’s acceptance 
of an inclusivist conception must have been caused by harmonizing 
impulses, and that those impulses must have led him to the conception 
of an inclusive life not dominated by a single type of activity but 
instead combining all human goods in a single scheme so that they 
could be pursued without major sacrifice of one or some of them, I
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virtuous activity can in Aristotle’s view override the considerations of happiness that 
dictate trying to engage in theoria as much as possible (pp. 9—10, 37, 39, 336, 344).
19. See pp. 271-72, 279-81.
20. Aristotle Ethics 10.8, 1179a33ff.
21. Aristotle’s claim that happiness is theoria is related in a complex and loose way 
to his claim that the best and happiest life is the life devoted to theoria. Neither claim 
means that ethically virtuous activity must be strictly minimized to the extent that more 
theorizing might thereby be made possible (cf. n. 18 above and my “Good as Goal”).
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can find no indication of what he could have thought such a scheme 
would look like, nor any sign that he ever seriously envisaged one. 
Not only in 10.6—8 but also in his other discussions of which lives are 
best, he regularly identifies the candidate lives by some dominant 
activity or aim, such as money or pleasure or virtue or reputation, to 
which the life is devoted. There is more to be said about why he held 
this view. At the moment, however, I simply maintain that he did 
hold it.
I also stress what it implies: that even though Aristotle believed 
that the best life includes various parts, his inclusivism recognized 
unavoidable conflict among them for a person’s time and resources. 
Rather than regarding human goods as somehow harmonizable with­
out sacrifice, Aristotle took them to be combinable only by the choice 
of one of them as the best and overriding one.22
*  He *
Next we come to the question whether the conflicts that Aristotle 
recognized involve the particular opposition that I have described 
between substantively egoistic or selfish goods and the broader 
considerations.
He does not raise this issue in 10.6-8 or use labels alluding to it 
in his contrast between the lives of theoria and of virtuous activity. To 
our way of thinking, however, it would seem natural to do so. Iri 
contradistinction to the life of virtuous activity, the life of theoria might 
seem to us to be self-absorbed and even selfish. Since it requires engag­
ing in a lesser amount of virtuous activity than the life in which that 
activity dominates, we may suppose that the life of theoria involves 
attending to one’s own well-being and neglecting some good that one 
might do to others. It does not require a person to act in radical 
opposition to ethical virtue—or so Aristotle indicates.23 Nor— I think 
it is clear— does it entail choosing at each and every turn to follow 
the course that will maximize the duration and optimize the quality
22. This presupposition underlies and explains Aristotle’s much-discussed state­
ment in 1098al7—19, to which he recurs in 1177al2—14, that if there is more than 
one virtue, then happiness must consist in activity in accordance with "the best and 
most complete” (my emphasis). In light of evidence for his inclusionist conception of 
happiness, interpreters have wondered why he does not say here that if there is more: 
than one virtue, happiness must consist in activity in accordance with all of them, 
together. I think that the right answer is given by those who say that he is there pointing 
to the presupposition that governs 10.6-8, namely, that the coordination of the plurality 
o f activities envisioned in the inclusivist conception requires that dominance be given 
to one of them. In other passages in the Ethics, however (such as 1100a4—5, 1101 a 15, 
1102a5-6; cf. Devereux, p. 204), he is focusing merely on his inclusive conception 
without highlighting this additional feature of it.
23. Aristotle Ethics 1178b33ff.
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of one’s theorizing.24 Even so, it plainly does involve partially removing 
oneself from practical spheres, thus sharply reducing the circum­
stances in which ethical virtue calls upon one to act.25 It thus will in 
all probability include considerably less ethically virtuous activity than 
might be necessary to rebut the charge that it is in some way egoistic. 
That is precisely why many interpreters have shied away from this way 
of reading Aristode and have tried instead to ascribe to his inclusivism a 
harmonizing motive and effect.
Nevertheless, even though 10.6—8 does have what are to us sub­
stantively egoistic implications, Aristotle does not label them as such. 
That might lead us to conclude that, whatever we may believe he has 
done, he himself does not think of the views expressed here in this 
way at all.
* * *
Such an impression, however, seems to me to be dispelled by 
another passage which has also provoked exegetical controversy. This 
is 9.8, which deals with friendship and self-love.
Before attacking the issue of substantive egoism in this passage, 
we should focus on the issue—for my overall purpose, the more funda­
mental—of conflict of aims.
It seems to me evident that in 9.8, Aristode maintains that there 
are situations in which only one of a pair of people can gain the 
greatest amount of good available. The chapter discusses “whether a 
man should love himself most, or someone else.” Aristode says that a 
friend is not a lover of self with respect to things like money or pleasure. 
(Note that here, as in bk. 10, Aristode ignores the idea of some com­
pound aim that harmoniously incorporates a plurality of goods.) At 
the end, however, he constructs a case designed to show that with 
regard to the best good, which is nobility or to kalon, “the good man 
should be a lover of self.” About this case Aristotle says the following: 
“[The good man] may even give up actions to his friend; it may be 
nobler to be the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself. In all 
actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to 
assign himself the greater share in what is noble [to kalon]."26
What I am stressing here at the moment is not the suggestion of 
egoism. It is the fact that the passage straightforwardly allows that 
sometimes there are circumstances in which competition arises over 
nobility, and especially the fact that Aristode looks to just such cases 
precisely in order to determine whether and how a good man is a
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24. Compare n. 18.
25. Aristotle Ethics 1178a24-b5, 8 -20 .
26. Ibid., 1169a33-bl, in Ross’s translation.
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lover of self.27 In these cases only one person can perform the virtuous 
act, and only one person can allow the other to perform it. According 
to Aristotle, the good man will allow his friend to perform it, because 
in that way he himself gets a greater share of nobility. If the friend 
reasoned in the same way, there would be a standoff. Each would 
say, “No, please, you do it.” We would have the makings of a classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
For this reason, there is, according to Aristotle’s view, no way for 
a person both to gain the greatest available amount of good for himsel f 
and to allow someone else to gain the greatest available amount of 
good. The aim of being maximally altruistic conflicts with the aim 
of maximizing one’s own well-being. One must choose the one or 
the other.28
To appreciate the significance of this fact, just think about how 
extraordinarily easy it would have been for Aristotle to avoid this 
conflict, by saying that really there is no competition here between 
the friends at all. The world serves up plenty of opportunities for 
virtuous action, he could have said, so the seeming scarcity is an illu­
sion. The friends could just go out and seize those ready opportunities. 
But Aristotle ignores this option. He persists in regarding the case as 
one in which only one person can have the best outcome.
Or is that impression the result of looking at the case in isolation? 
Perhaps it really is supposed to take place in a context that gives 
everyone ample scope for virtuous action without reducing anyone 
else’s chances. That is the effect of Richard Kraut’s interpretation. He 
holds that the case presupposes a “fair” competition, which spurs 
people on to more virtue. Moreover, Kraut maintains that the case 
also takes place in a context containing many opportunities for virtu­
ous action, which must be divided up equally among equally virtuous 
people.29 Viewed in this way, the competitive situation is really only 
a small and comparatively unimportant part of the overall picture, in 
which virtuous efforts are given equal scope on all sides.
Kraut concedes that his interpretation “reads something into this 
chapter that is not explicitly said,” but I think that it does much more
27. This fact has been stressed by Richard Kraut, "Comments on Julia Annas’ ‘Self­
Love in Aristode,’ ” Southern Journal of Philosophy 27, suppl. (1989): 19—23. However, for 
reasons that will emerge below (see pp. 279-80 and n. 48), this is not to say that the 
good man seeks victory in such competitions for its own sake.
28. Aristode might have said that the way to get the greatest good for oneself is 
to allow one’s friend to allow oneself to perform the virtuous act, by performing the 
act with the acquiescence of one’s friend. And one could reiterate this argument, with 
the result that there would in fact be no greatest good for either. Aristotle, however, 
does not follow this line of thought, perhaps because he would not find it intuitive to 
think of allowing someone to allow one to do something as a kind of act.
29. Kraut, "Comments on Julia Annas’ ‘Self-Love in Aristode,’ ” p. 22.
)
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than that.30 It appears to me to vitiate Aristotle’s procedure at the end 
of the chapter. That procedure is to explain the sense in which a good 
man should be a lover of self, precisely by examining a case in which 
there is, as Kraut acknowledges, competition for the best good. Kraut’s 
interpretation supposes that Aristotle’s presentation of his procedure 
here is thoroughly misleading, since it must be supposed to be operat­
ing against a backdrop of overall noncompetition which the chapter 
itself ignores.
Kraut appeals to what he takes to be Aristotle’s acceptance of the 
principle that equally virtuous people ought to be accorded equal 
opportunity to exercise their virtue, on the ground that “presumably 
he would say that equals must share equally.”31 Kraut finds support 
for attributing some such general principle to Aristotle, for instance, 
in the account of distributive justice in Ethics 5, and also in 8.7, where 
Aristotle explores connections between justice and friendship.
The question, though, is whether Aristotle would sanction the 
particular application of the principle of equality to this case. I doubt 
that. In the passage quoted above, the sentence, “In all actions, there­
fore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign himself 
the greater share in what is noble,” sounds to me too much like an 
explicit repudiation of such an application, rather than something 
that is supposed to be read in the light of it. Therefore, though recog­
nizing that there is more to be said on this question, I hold that the 
competitive situation here is not to be placed against the globally 
conflict-free backdrop that Kraut proposes for it.
If anything could provide that backdrop, it would seem to be a 
chapter like 8.7, with its discussion of the relation of equality and 
justice to friendship. Toward the end of the chapter Aristotle points 
out that since a god is too far superior to a man for friendship to hold 
between them, one would not wish one’s friend to become a god. That 
fact, he says, provokes the question whether one really wishes the 
greatest good for one’s friend. Then he says, “The answer is that if 
we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, 
his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; 
therefore it is for the friend only so long as that friend remains a man 
that he will wish the greatest good,” and then he concludes with the 
(as I interpret it) telling sentence, “But perhaps not all the greatest 
goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good” 
(my emphasis).
30. Ibid., p. 23; see also Julia Annas, “Self-Love in Aristotle,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 27, suppl. (1989): 1-18, pp. 7—8, as well as her “Plato and Aristotle on 
Friendship and Altruism,” Mind 86 (1977): 532—54.
31. Kraut, “Comments on Annas’ ‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’ ” p. 22. See also Kraut, 
Aristotle on the Human Good, pp. 97—103, 119.
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I take it, then, that Aristotle is saying that we must focus on cases 
in which the good man must choose between gaining the most of the 
best good for himself and letting his friend gain it. Further, Aristotle 
says that the good man will choose the former course.
* * *
The next problem is whether this latter claim raises a question of 
substantive egoism. Aristotle certainly seems to think that it does. After 
all, the chapter is written precisely in order to respond to that 
question.32
Readers nowadays, however, might find it hard to see how that 
could be the case. The chief ground would be, I think, that the good 
that Aristotle thinks a person gains by being a lover of self is an ethical 
good, to kalon, and that it is gained by giving something to someone 
else.33 But this, we tend to think, cannot fundamentally be a matter 
of substantive egoism at all.
However, the temptation to read Aristotle with this idea in mind 
seems to me to arise from a conflation of our notion of ethical (or 
even moral) good with the one that Aristotle indicates he is operating 
with. For us, ethical good is not scarce. Any case in which it briefly 
seems so, we think, should be regarded as taking place within a broader 
context in which that is not true. As Kraut’s interpretation illustrates, 
we emphatically do not believe that within any important context, one 
person’s having more ethical good means another person’s having 
less. That could happen, we think, only in the very short term, in a way 
that allows ample further chances for opportunities to be equalized. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, insists on looking to an occasion of scarcity 
of to kalon, precisely in order to reach a verdict on the question whether 
a good man is a lover of self.
The reason why Aristotle thinks both that the good man can 
unobjectionably aim at the greatest amount of nobility and that doing
32. With the aim of blunting the impression of egoism that this passage conveys, 
Annas reads Aristotle as drawing a distinction between what “explains” the agent’s 
action and what “motivates” him: the agent’s beneficence toward his friend is “explained” 
by the ultimate aim of his own happiness, but what he (consciously) aims at is the 
friend’s good. See “Self-Love in Aristotle,” pp. 12-15. It does not seem to me that 
Aristotle is employing this distinction, nor in any case that it would blunt the effect (if 
what he says in this passage. When he maintains that “the good man assigns himself 
the greater share in what is noble,” it seems to me that he is talking as much about the 
good man’s motivation as about the explanation of what he does.
33. Annas holds that Aristotle treats the good in question in this chapter as some­
thing that everyone equally can maximize without leaving any less for anyone else; see 
ibid., pp. 8, 11. It seems to me that she is moving too dose to the conception of love 
that she cites from Shelley’s Epipsychidion. The passage that I have quoted, however, 
seems to me explicitly to express the contrary view, that to kalon is sometimes scarce. 
See also Kraut, “Comments on Julia Annas’ ‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’ ” p. 21.
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so is better than aiming at the greatest amount of money or pleasure 
is not that the former kind of self-love is really not substantively egois­
tic, nor that there is always enough nobility to go around, nor that 
rivalry over virtue is mutually beneficial whereas competition over 
other goods is not. Rather, I think that the reason is simply that money 
and pleasure are not in the true sense as genuinely goods, for oneself, 
as nobility is. That is a quite different kind of concern on his part 
from the one that a harmonizing interpretation would impute to him.
* * *
I conclude that Aristotle’s intention in these passages, and also in 
the rest of the Ethics, is not to demonstrate a harmony of one’s own 
good with broader considerations nor to vindicate inclusivist eudai­
monism against a charge of egoism. He is not much worried about 
that charge— though 9.8 makes plain that he is fully aware of it. When 
he does deal with it, he does so with plenty of sangfroid and without 
betraying any sign that it could have been a principal aim of his 
doctrine to rebut the charge, or establish the harmony.
* * *
By this time the reader who recalls the Kantian Interpretation 
might well be coming to think that it, for all its current unfashionabil- 
ity, is starting to look pretty good. If Aristode shows the degree of 
substantive egoism that his ideas about friendship seem to point to, 
then is it not, after all, entirely correct to regard him as an out-and- 
out egoist who aims at his own substantive happiness and for whom 
that is the sole justification for ethical and altruistic action, as well as 
for friendship?
However, this interpretation, too, runs into difficulty. According 
to Aristode the good man benefits his friends “for their sake” and 
engages in virtuous activity “for itself.” Taken at face value, this seems 
to preclude what he seems to say in Ethics 1, that we should choose 
these things for the sake of our own happiness. Moreover, he does 
not retract this view in the passage about self-love that we have exam­
ined. But if he really thought that our actions should be entirely self- 
regarding, that would have been the place to say so. How, then, do 
we square this idea with what we have already seen?
This problem does not affect the Kantian Interpretation alone. It 
is a problem for all interpretations. We all need to reconcile Aristotle’s 
explicit claim that happiness is the end of all that we do with his 
equally explicit claim that friends’ good and virtuous action are valued 
for themselves.
One tempting but (in my view) ultimately untenable solution to 
this problem is suggested by an idea of Mill to which I have already
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alluded and which has been used to interpret a Greek inclusivist notion 
of happiness.34 In expounding his own view Mill says, “The ingredients 
of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, 
and not merely as swelling an aggregate.” Slightly later he explains, 
“In being desired for its own sake [something] is . . .  desired as part of 
happiness.. . .  The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire 
of happiness.”35 His idea seems to be that the desire for a given part 
of happiness for its own sake is not to be distinguished from the desire 
for happiness itself.
If we follow Mill, then we seemingly can hold that for Aristotle, 
aiming at virtuous action for itself and aiming at it for the sake of 
happiness are the very same thing. That would perhaps be a way of 
squaring those indications that happiness is supposed to be our final 
end with the evidence that we supposedly pursue ethical virtue and 
friends’ good for themselves. But that result does not seem, after all, 
to fit the Kantian Interpretation, which presupposes a dualism of, 
and possible conflict between, one’s own happiness and the broader 
considerations. Mill’s idea, however, seems to be a form of inclusivism 
that is aimed at obliterating just that dualism. For that reason Mill’s 
idea does not seem to offer aid to the Kantian Interpretation.
Reasoning about Mill’s idea is made very difficult, I would say, by 
its obscurity. Contrary to what he says, it seems to me clear that to 
desire some part of happiness for itself and to desire it as a part of 
happiness are two quite different things. The distinction between the 
two is especially clear in view of the fact that distinct parts of happiness 
can, as aims, come into conflict with each other, as we have seen that 
in Aristotle’s view they can. Unfortunately, Mill does not here mention 
the possibility of conflict,36 so it is difficult to know how he would 
respond to it.
But whether or not Mill’s idea can be made clear enough to avoid 
problems arising from conflicts among parts of happiness, I doubt 
that the idea was entertained by Aristotle. He never articulates the 
identity of desires that Mill’s view asserts. When he draws the distinc­
tion between desiring something for itself and desiring it for something 
else, moreover, he does not seem to me even to hint that these two 
things can coincide in the way that Mill claims.37 His silence on the
34. See, e.g., Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory, p. 341, and (perhaps) Aristotle’s First Princi­
ples, p. 606, n. 32.
35. Mill, chap. 4 (with my emphasis). I take the latter clause to be an explanation 
of the former, not to express a further point.
36. Butler does, though. He recognizes that one aim can “interfere” with others 
and thereby with self-love as a whole. That is why he says only that there is no “peculiar” 
contrariety between love of neighbor and self-love, not that there is no contrariety at 
all (secs. 12-13, 18-20).
37. See esp. Ethics 1 .1-2, 4, 7; 10.6-7.
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point, I think, tells against the hypothesis that Mill’s idea is what he 
has in mind.
* * *
All the more so, too, because there is another way, which Aristotle 
articulates explicitly, for him to handle the matter. This is the idea 
that something can be desired or aimed at both for its own sake and 
for something else, in the sense of being aimed at partly for the sake 
of each.38 For instance, he says, “honor, pleasure, reason, and every 
virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing else resulted 
from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them 
also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall 
be happy.”39 He also says of “intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures 
and honors,” that “if we pursue these also for the sake of something 
else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves.”40
Although the notion of desiring something partly for itself and 
pardy for the sake of something else is not without obscurity, it seems 
to me a notion that we do try to operate with in everyday discourse.41 
It also fits what Aristotle wants to say. It seems to be plausible to say 
that in his view, one desires both virtuous action and one’s friend’s 
well-being, for example, partly for itself and partly for the sake of 
one’s own happiness 42
When Aristotle says that one desires both of these things for 
themselves, he takes for granted that one also desires them for the 
sake of one’s happiness. For he has made it explicit from very early 
on that one desires everything for the sake of happiness43—in part, 
that is, since some things are also desired for their own sakes, not just 
for happiness. This interpretation also fits Aristotle’s way of singling 
out what is special about happiness. Happiness is not the only thing 
that is valued for itself; it is the only thing that is valued for itself and 
not for anything else.44
Rather than putting things Mill’s way, then, Aristotle is better 
read as saying that some things are desired both as parts of happiness 
and also for themselves. That preserves the distinction that Aristotle
38. On this idea in Aristotle’s ethics, see Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, pp. 
43, n. 26; 207.
39. Aristotle Ethics 1.7 1097bl-5; cf. a30-34.
40. Ibid., 1096bl8—19.
41. The main obscurity arises when one tries to explain what to say when there 
is conflict between the thing desired and that for the sake of which, in part, it is desired.
42. To this extent I would agree with Kraut, p. 22, concerning “mixed motivation"; 
and Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” p. 332 (but cf. pp. 309—10, which perhaps 
moves in a different direction).
43. Aristotle Ethics 1097al5-23, 1176b30-32.
44. Ibid., 1176b30-32.
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draws and makes it rather clearer, it seems to me, than the idea that 
Mill suggests.
On this account the Kantian Interpretation turns out to be largely 
wrong but still contains some truth. One goal of virtuous action and 
beneficence toward friends is indeed one’s own happiness, since ac­
cording to Aristotle everything else is done for the sake of that.45 
Virtuous action and beneficence also, however, have value for them­
selves. For that reason it is wrong to picture Aristotle as thinking 
that one’s own happiness is the sole basis of ethical and altruistic 
considerations. Even more, if one’s virtuous action is to be a part of 
happiness, I take it, one must desire such action for itself, not merely 
as a part o f happiness. Similarly, to be a friend and have the benefits 
of friendship, one must desire the good of one’s friends for their sake.46
* * *
Given this fact, we can see that Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
views on friendship has an implication that is importantly right. Al­
though Aristotle says that the good man will assign himself the greater 
share of nobility in the sort of situation of scarcity described in 9.8, 
he certainly holds neither that the good man will try to maximize the 
number of occasions on which he may successfully compete with others 
for nobility nor that as a general policy he will try to maximize his 
superiority in virtue over them.47
To suppose that Aristotle meant such a thing would be to make 
two mistakes. First, Aristotle’s good man is not interested in competi­
tion per se. It is not, in other words, that the good man has some 
positive attraction to outdoing his friend for the sake of the the out­
doing itself nor a desire that whatever his friend gets, he get more.
45. Here a large issue arises, which I cannot treat adequately here. When Aristotle 
says that we desire everything for the sake of happiness, does he mean— when it all 
comes out in the wash in Ethics 10.6—8— that we desire everything for the sake of 
theoria, o r that we desire everything for the sake of the life that is dominated by theoria1! 
The answer is, I think, some of both. Aside from being valuable for themselves, other 
activities contribute as parts to the life that includes them and theoria, and some of them 
contribute causally to the activity of theorizing. (As is often noted, it is not plausible to 
suppose that all of them do the latter.) Aristotle subsumes both of these relations under 
the expression pros (see, e.g., W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2d ed. [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980], p. 256), though there is no reason to say that he 
confuses them.
46. Cooper, “Aristode on Friendship,” pp. 309-10, perhaps means to locate a 
problem at this point, but it seems to me that Aristotle’s view as I interpret it is free of 
incoherence. What makes it so is precisely the fact that the friends’ good is desired 
partly for itself, so that it would be desired even if it did not contribute to one’s happiness 
(Aristotle Ethics 1097b 1—5). So it is not, incoherently, “desired for itself for the sake of 
one’s happiness.” Compare n. 41 above.
47. See Kraut, “Comments on Julia Annas’ ‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’” p. 23.
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That would make it an intrinsically competitive matter, which is not 
Aristotle’s meaning. Rather, his view in 9.8 is that the good man, 
seeing that in certain circumstances he can get the greatest good only 
by getting more than his friend, chooses to do so.48
Second, Aristode does not take the occurrence of competitive 
situations concerning virtue to point to any general policy. There is 
no evidence that he takes such situations to be common or easy to 
produce. Otherwise he would certainly have been obliged to explore 
issues about them further. For the most part, however, he thinks of 
relations among friends as characterized by cooperation, not competi­
tion, and as permitting beneficence toward one’s friends for their sake. 
Competitive situations do somedmes occur, but they are not all-perva­
sive.49 There is not always enough nobility to go around, but there 
usually is. On those occasions when scarcity arises, the good man seeks 
nobility even if others will have less. When there is no such scarcity, 
he aims for his friends’ benefit for their sake.
* * *
We should conclude, I think, that neither the Kantian nor the 
Hegelian Interpretation satisfactorily describes Aristotle’s position. In­
deed, a reason why Aristotle’s view strikes his reader as elusive is 
perhaps that it is such a subde mixture of the things that the Kantian 
and Hegelian Interpretations, respectively, make us expect. On the 
one hand, Aristotle does not think that the value of every element of 
one’s happiness consists in its contribution thereto.50 Since he believes 
that ethical and altruistic action are valuable partly for themselves, he 
does not think that they are justified solely by their contribution to 
well-being. In that sense, he does not think of them simply as aspects 
of self-regarding prudence.
On the other hand, he also does not think that one’s own well­
being is in perfect harmony with ethical and altruistic considerations. 
These broader considerations can and sometimes do conflict with one’s 
own good. When that happens, Aristotle’s view seems to be that at
48. Here I would disagree with what seems to be Kraut’s view at ibid., p. 20, 
and with his citation thereto of Ethics 1168b25-29, as well as the way in which his 
interpretation, so far as I understand it, seems to rely on the supposition of a large role 
for intrinsically competitive rivalry over nobility among the virtuous (cf. n. 27 above). 
See also Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, pp. 97, 119.
49. This fact, it seems to me, and not the principle of equality that Kraut adduces, 
is what limits people in their pursuit of virtue to the detriment of others’ pursuit of 
the same thing and prevents a no-holds-barred competition from arising.
50. For this reason he does not fall afoul of Butler’s argument against saying that 
every desire that one has is ultimately just a desire for one’s own happiness. Compare 
n. 35 above. Indeed, what I think that Butler’s argument shows is that for an inclusivist 
who does not try to adopt Mill's (to me very obscure) view, the parts o f happiness must 
be regarded as aimed at partly for themselves.
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least sometimes—as in the instance described in 9.8—the good man 
will aim for his own good. That does not imply that the friend’s good 
is to be valued solely for one’s own well-being— I have just explained 
why that is not so. But it does mean that the friend’s good does not 
override one’s own good, at least in this case, where the two conflict 
and to kalon is not to be evenly shared by all.
The Hegelian Interpretation is thus partially successful in de­
fending Aristotle against the criticism that the Kantian Interpretation 
levels against him. But it is only very partially so, if I am right that 
Aristotle does not defend a harmony of one’s own well-being with the 
broader considerations and does not particularly try to defend his view 
against the charge of substantive egoism.
* * *
But the inclusivist style of interpretation is born of the feeling 
that we can do better by Aristotle than I am saying we can, that a 
harmony can be found in his view, and that even if he does not fully 
develop his defense of it, it is a good idea that in charity ought to be 
attributed to him or at least be regarded as what he was driving at.
This final argument for an inclusivist interpretation aims at a 
charitable interpretation based on philosophical grounds, and it can 
be met partly by a philosophical reply. For it seems to me that in fact 
inclusivism is not a convincing way of establishing such a harmony of 
one’s own good with the broader considerations. There is not enough 
space here for me to demonstrate this fully, but I shall briefly outline 
one of the arguments to this effect.51
* * *
Earlier I described the reasons why an inclusivist eudaimonism 
should hold that happiness needs to be described not just by a list of 
worthwhile things but also by specifying some structure by which its 
parts are organized. Otherwise ethical and altruistic considerations 
might play only a small role in comparison to substantively egoistic 
ones. The structure is necessary to ensure a form of eudaimonism 
that can be defended against the charge of egoism. It gives us a way 
of insisting that a life will count as happy only if it includes certain parts 
and only if substantively egoistic parts do not play too commanding a 
role in it. (This, as I have argued, is something that Aristotle’s own 
view does not guarantee, even though it recognizes the need for the 
parts of happiness to be organized into some structure.)52
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51. For more on this argument, see my “Neoaristotelian Inclusivist Eudaimonism.”
52. Interpreters o f Aristotle have frequently maintained that happiness must in 
Aristotle’s view have some structure, though they have not cited this particular reason. 
See, e.g., Hardie, “The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics" (“the orderly and harmonious
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Different formulations might achieve this end, but a natural one 
for an inclusivist to adopt is to say that ethical activity and the good 
of others are so very, very good for a person, and so very much better 
than substantively egoistic parts of well-being are, that a life would be 
much less good if the former did not predominate than if they did. 
It would hardly seem selfish to seek one’s well-being on these terms. 
This position seems to give due weight to broader considerations while 
at the same time not forcing one to limit one’s own well-being in order 
to do so.
Still, we are left wondering whether there is any important differ­
ence between the inclusivist view and the position of the dualist, which 
treats the broader considerations as distinct from the individual’s own 
substantive good. In both cases we find admittedly substantive egoistic 
considerations potentially in conflict with broader considerations. Du­
alism calls these latter external to one’s good, while eudaimonism calls 
them a part of one’s own good. Is that an important difference? On 
both views, something external to one’s own admittedly substantive 
good weighs against it. Why, then, is this form of eudaimonism not 
simply a relabeling of dualism?
Various responses to this question are available, but there is room 
to question whether they yield any significant difference between the 
two formulations. For instance, the inclusivist may try to set his view 
off against dualism by saying that the broader considerations benefit 
one’s “true self,” or the element of one’s self that is distinctly human. 
Plato sometimes talks in this way, as does Butler.53
I have not by any means demonstrated that there is nothing to 
choose between inclusivist eudaimonism and dualism. I have simply 
posed a challenge to the inclusivist to explain what the difference 
is—other than a relabeling of certain considerations as parts of one’s 
good rather than further things potentially weighing against it—and 
why the difference should cut in favor of eudaimonism. The dualist, 
on the other hand, might claim it as a virtue of his position that it is 
more frank and open than eudaimonism is about the way in which 
the broader considerations diminish the scope for substantively self- 
benefiting pursuits.
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gratification o f desires,” p. 280); Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (“priorities,” pp. 
135-36); and Annas, “The Good Life and the Lives of Others,” (“an overall structure 
which gives her life coherence and direction,” p. 134).
53. Some accounts depict Aristotle as arguing this way, though he ends up  saying 
that theoria, not virtuous activity, appeals to the element that is most truly oneself 
(Aristode Ethics 1178a2-7, 1166a 17-18). But the dualist can maintain an analogous 
view, namely, that one’s true self or reason is susceptible to appeals to goods that are 
not goods for oneself but are based instead on what is good non-self-referentially. Both 
positions say that the substantively egoistic goods are outbid by other considerations. 
In that respect the two views are the same.
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At the least, the argument demonstrates that in and of itself, 
inclusivism by itself does not reach the goal of harmony and non­
egoism, that is, not without very substantial supplementation. That 
conclusion, however, makes it harder to argue that the way to read 
Aristode charitably is to say that that goal is the one that his inclusivist 
conception of happiness was designed to reach.
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